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ELIMINATING A SAFE HAVEN FOR
DISCRIMINATION: WHY NEW YORK MUST




On November 2, 1989, a Brooklyn jury convicted Milton
Bennett of second degree murder and second degree and third
degree criminal possession of a weapon.' On July 5, 1994, the
Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court reversed
Bennett's conviction because the prosecutor improperly used her
peremptory challenges during jury selection and ordered a new
trial.2 During jury selection, the prosecutor exercised three
peremptory challenges to exclude Black women from the jury.3
Defense counsel, in turn, argued that the prosecutor employed the
peremptory challenges in a purposefully discriminatory manner by
intentionally removing African American women jurors solely on
the basis of their race.4 Such discriminatory use of the peremptory
challenge is hardly uncommon. U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Thurgood Marshall has stated, and this Note argues, that the only
way to eradicate the racial prejudice that peremptory challenges
inject into the jury selection process is to eliminate them entirely.5
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 1996. The author wishes to thank Brooklyn
Law School Professor Stacy Caplow for her valuable assistance in the preparation
of this Note.
People v. Bennett, 614 N.Y.S.2d 430 (2d Dep't 1994).
2 id
I d. at 431-32.
4 Id at 431.
s Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103 (1986). In Batson, an all-White jury
convicted a Black defendant of second degree burglary and receipt of stolen
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Instead of deeming peremptory challenges unconstitutional and
forsaking the system entirely, the U.S. Supreme Court attempted to
limit this unbridled use of peremptory challenges to comport with
the guarantees of equal protection.6 In 1986, the Court announced
a framework to guide lower courts in their determination of
improper discrimination in jury selection.7 The initial burden rests
on the party alleging purposeful discrimination to make a prima
facie showing that raises an inference of discrimination.8 The
burden then shifts to the opposing party to rebut the inference by
providing a neutral explanation for its challenged peremptory
strikes.9 Finally, the trial judge must determine whether the movant
has proven purposeful discrimination. °
goods. Id. at 82-83. The prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike the only
four Black people from the jury. Id at 83. The defendant appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court, arguing, among other things, that the prosecutor's striking of
Black jurors violated the defendant's equal protection rights. Id. The Court
reversed and remanded the case, holding that the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits prosecutors from using peremptory challenges to remove jurors based
solely on their race or on the assumption that Black jurors are incapable of
impartially weighing the State's evidence against a Black defendant. Id. at 89.
The Court set forth a framework to guide lower courts in implementing its
holding. Id. at 96. For analysis and discussion of this framework, see infra notes
43-62 and accompanying text.
6 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. The U.S. Constitution guarantees that "[n]o
State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Equal protection insures that the
government neither classifies its citizens in an irrelevant nor illegitimate manner,
thereby inequitably allocating the benefits and burdens among similarly situated
individuals, without a sufficient justification. The discriminatory exercise of
peremptory challenges, without such an adequate explanation, enforced by the
judiciary, in turn, is a violation of this guarantee of equal protection. See
Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65
TEMP. L. REv. 369, 400 (1992).
' Batson, 476 U.S. at 83-98. The appellate division applied the Batson
framework in Bennett to determine that the prosecution purposefully discrimi-
nated against potential jurors with its peremptory challenges. Bennett, 614
N.Y.S.2d at 432.
' Batson, 476 U.S. at 93.
9 Id at 94.
10 Id. at 98.
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As Chief Justice Warren Burger predicted, the challenge to
lower courts implementing the Batson framework has proven
insurmountable due to insufficient guidance from the Supreme
Court as to what constitutes a prima facie case and, more impor-
tantly, how to discern a race-neutral explanation." However, this
Note argues that even where lower courts have effectively formu-
lated and used the Batson framework, as they have in New York
State, 12 Batson's attempt to accommodate the interests of achiev-
ing fair and impartial juries and abolishing discrimination from jury
selection has been an exercise in futility.'3 The greatest problem
posed by Batson is the impossibility of scrutinizing attorneys'
attempts at race-neutral explanations for challenges that are
arbitrary by nature. Not only can clever lawyers circumvent this
requirement by proffering facially neutral explanations that have a
discriminatory impact on potential jurors, but even when attorneys'
explanations are deemed discriminatory, and their peremptory
challenges are disallowed, both the juror's equal protection right
and the peremptory nature of the peremptory challenge system have
been compromised. 14 Thus, Batson's attempt to balance these
conflicting interests of preserving the peremptory challenge system
and protecting the defendant's and the challenged juror's equal
protection rights necessarily fails. Because the peremptory challenge
" Chief Justice Burger stated that because the Court made no attempt to
instruct lower courts how best to implement the Batson framework, "there is no
'good' way to implement the holding, let alone a 'best' way." Id. at 131 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
2 For more information on New York cases which have applied the Batson
framework, see discussion infra part III.
" See infra part V. See generally Broderick, supra note 6, at 420-22
(arguing that, notwithstanding the advances represented by Batson, peremptory
challenges should be eliminated because they will continue to be used to
discriminate in court proceedings and suggesting that increased use of challenges
for cause will be sufficient to secure impartial juries); Theodore McMillian &
Christopher J. Petrini, Batson v. Kentucky: A Promise Unfulfilled, 58 UMKC L.
REV. 361 (1990) (asserting that peremptory challenges should be eliminated
because the Batson doctrine is ineffective in combating discrimination and
recommending expansion of voir dire and challenges for cause to retain any
benefits of the peremptory challenge).
14 See infra part III.
607
JOURNAL OF LA WAND POLICY
is not a right guaranteed by the Constitution, 5 but rather is a
creature of state statutory law,16 this Note proposes that the New
York State legislature abrogate the peremptory challenge statute
from the Criminal Procedure Law entirely to protect potential
jurors' equal protection and civil rights. 7
Part I of this Note provides a brief background of the peremp-
tory challenge and demonstrates how it perpetuates discrimination
in the jury selection process. Part II examines the U.S. Supreme
Court decisions of Batson v Kentucky and its progeny, which
further extend its holding and erode the free exercise of peremptory
challenges. In part III, this Note focuses on the application of
Batson in New York and its ineffectiveness in eradicating purpose-
ful discrimination from the jury selection process. This part
analyzes several decisions from New York's lower courts to explain
the recurring problems with implementing the rebuttal, or race-
neutral prong of the Batson doctrine. Part IV of this Note criticizes
the Jury Project's recommendation, in its Report to the Chief Judge
of the State of New York, to revise the peremptory challenge
statute. This Note concludes by proposing that the New York State
legislature's abrogation of the peremptory challenge statute in the
Criminal Procedure Law is the only way to achieve Batson true
purpose of eliminating discrimination from the jury selection
process.
"5 Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
16 See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.25 (McKinney 1993) (providing
the number of peremptory strikes allowable for different crimes).
17 See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11 which provides:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state
or any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color,
creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights
by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by
the state or any agency or subdivision of the state.
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 13 (McKinney 1993) ("No citizen of the state
possessing all other qualifications which are or may be required or prescribed by
law, shall be disqualified to serve as a ... petit juror in any court of this state
on account of race.").
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I. DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION: THE PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGE
A peremptory challenge is defined as a challenge to a juror at
the time of impanelling for which no reason need be advanced.'"
Purportedly, lawyers employ peremptory challenges to obtain fair
and impartial juries, but in practice lawyers seek to assemble juries
who are favorable to their clients.' 9 For this reason, prosecutors,
for example, commonly use their peremptory challenges to strike
jurors who themselves or whose relatives have previously encoun-
tered the criminal justice system;20 are unemployed or have
employment that suggests a sympathetic predisposition to defen-
dants;2' or are unable to weigh the evidence fairly based on their
statements or the attorney's perception of the juror's demeanor.22
The peremptory challenge, although not a constitutional right, has
a deeply rooted tradition in both England and America. 23 English
common law allowed the criminal defendant thirty-five peremptory
18 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 230 (6th ed. 1990).
'9 Brent J. Gurney, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in
Criminal Trials, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 227, 230-36 (1986) ("In practice
... lawyers have converted this ostensible search for impartial juries into a
search for favorable juries. Their strategy is to use peremptory challenges to
eliminate prospective jurors who have cultural characteristics or social
perspectives which the attorney suspects will limit the jurors' receptiveness to
their clients' claims.").
20 See infra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 132-39 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 112-19 and accompanying text; Brian J. Serr & Mark
Maney, Racism, Peremptory Challenges, and the Democratic Jury: The
Jurisprudence of a Delicate Balance, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 44-45
(1988) (providing common reasons for exercising peremptory challenges which
fall into two categories: objectively verifiable reasons and unarticulable "gut"
feelings).
23 For a detailed account of the peremptory challenge's history, see Swain
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-20 (1965); see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 119-20 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (tracing the history of the
peremptory challenge back to the Romans in 104 B.C.).
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challenges,24 while the prosecutor had unlimited use of peremp-
tory challenges. 25 Although the English Parliament rescinded the
prosecutor's peremptory challenges in 1305, it was not until the
1988 Criminal Justice Act that Parliament abrogated the defendant's
right to use peremptory challenges entirely because defense
attorneys were misusing the system to stack juries with individuals
biased toward their side.26
In contrast, attorneys in the United States widely use and rely
upon the peremptory challenge mechanism, purportedly to achieve
fair and impartial juries.27 A petit jury is selected from the venire,
a group of people summoned by the court for service.28 The
venirepersons, before selection to a petit jury, undergo a lengthy
period of pretrial questioning, called the voir dire, during which the
attorneys and the court ascertain each venireperson's ability to be
fair and impartial judges of the evidence at trial.29 At this time,
attorneys may eliminate potential jurors who are most likely biased
toward the other side. 3' Both the prosecutor and the criminal
defendant are entitled to a certain number of peremptory chal-
lenges, but the number of challenges allowed varies from
24 Swain, 380 U.S. at 212 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
353 (15th ed. 1809)).
25 Id. at 213 (citing COKE ON LITTLETON 156 (14th ed. 1791)).
26 See Broderick, supra note 6, at 372-73 (discussing the historical demise
of peremptory challenges in England).
27 See Swain, 380 U.S. at 218-20.
28 For background and commentary on jury selection procedure, see JON
VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO
REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 85-137 (1977).
29 See id. at 140-41 (providing a brief description of the voir dire process);
Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 153, 157-63
(1989) (describing the voir dire examination; arguing that the method is
patronizing to prospective jurors due to the probing and personal nature of the
questions asked and inefficient as a means of obtaining an unbiased jury because
the questions are designed "not to gain information but to make a point").
30 See Serr & Maney, supra note 22, at 8 ("[Tjhe closer the similarity
between a prospective juror and the defendant, the more likely the prosecutor
will strike the juror ... [based] on the assumption that defendants and jurors of
similar backgrounds are likely to share basic views about life.").
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jurisdiction to jurisdiction.3' In contrast, challenges for cause,
which may only be exercised under specific statutory conditions
where juror bias is evident, are unlimited." However, because the
courts traditionally do not require any reason to strike a juror
peremptorily, attorneys have enjoyed the freedom to purposefully
discriminate against potential jurors on the basis of race, gender
and other invidious grounds.33
Such discrimination in jury selection violates the equal
protection right of both the defendant and the excluded juror.34
The defendant's right is potentially violated because he or she is
denied the precise protection that a trial by jury is intended to
provide.35 In essence, when attorneys use discriminatory criteria
to eject jurors, they pervert the guarantee that a peer jury consists
of a body of the defendant's neighbors, associates and persons
"' See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.25 (McKinney 1993), which
states in part:
1. A peremptory challenge is an objection to a prospective juror for
which no reason need be assigned. Upon any peremptory challenge, the
court must exclude the person challenged from service.
2. Each party must be allowed the following number of peremptory
challenges:
(a) Twenty for the regular jurors if the highest crime charged
is a class A felony, and two for each alternate juror to be
selected.
(b) Fifteen for the regular jurors if the highest crime charged
is a class B or class C felony, and two for each alternate
juror to be selected.
(c) Ten for the regular jurors in all other cases, and two for
each alternate juror to be selected.
32 Challenges for cause are appropriate, for example, when a prospective
juror does not meet particular qualifications of the state judiciary law, when a
juror possesses a state of mind likely to prevent the juror from rendering an
impartial verdict, or when the juror is related to the defendant in any way. See,
e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.20 (McKinney 1993) (providing reasons why
courts may grant parties challenges for cause in criminal cases).
13 Serr & Maney, supra note 22, at 7-8 ("Because peremptory challenges
allow both the prosecutor and defendant to strike a prospective juror at whim,
they provide ample opportunity to discriminate.").
34 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986); see supra note 6 and
accompanying text.
" Batson, 476 U.S. at 86.
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sharing a common background and social status.36 Moreover, the
excluded juror's equal protection rights are violated because the
juror's competence is determined simply by the person's race37 or
gender,38 rather than an by objective assessment of the juror's
qualifications and ability to impartially consider the evidence
presented at trial.
The peremptory challenge necessarily conflicts with these equal
protection rights because peremptory challenges are by their very
nature arbitrary and unexplainable, based on the "seat-of-the-pants"
instincts of the challenging attorney.39 Such a basis is "undoubt-
edly crudely stereotypical," and such instinctual stereotyping may,
in many cases, be "hopelessly mistaken."4 ° Further, such stereo-
types are likely premised upon prejudice, whether conscious or
unconscious; thus a peremptory challenge, requiring no explanation,
may be used as a safe haven for discrimination. 41 Therefore,
applying the Equal Protection Clause to the jury selection system
has predictably diminished the peremptory nature of peremptory
challenges.42
36 See id. (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879)).
17 Id. at 87.
38 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1422 (1994).
3' Batson, 476 U.S. at 138 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see Alschuler, supra
note 29, at 170 ("Peremptory challenges ensure the selection of jurors on the
basis of insulting stereotypes without substantially advancing the goal of making
juries more impartial. The Equal Protection Clause forbids the arbitrary
classification of human beings, and peremptory challenges are inherently arbi-
trary.").
40 Batson, 476 U.S. at 138.
"' See id. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring); Serr & Maney, supra note 22,
at 7-9 (arguing that the very nature of peremptory challenges is in conflict with
the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause); see also Alschuler, supra note 29,
at 163-70 (asserting the irreconcilable nature of peremptory challenges and equal
protection guarantees).
41 Serr & Maney, supra note 22, at 10 (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202, 221-22 (1965)) ("[T]o limit or qualify peremptory challenges is to destroy
them . . . . To subject the ... challenge ... to the demands and traditional
standards of the Equal Protection Clause would entail a radical change in the
nature and operation of the challenge. The challenge,pro tanto, would no longer
be peremptory.").
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II. THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
A. Batson v. Kentucky
43
In an attempt to rid the justice system of this pervasive,
invidious discrimination, the U.S. Supreme Court has curbed
attorneys' unbridled use of peremptory challenges under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.44 Unfortu-
nately, the Court's effort has failed because discrimination in jury
selection remains pervasive. In the 1986 landmark decision of
Batson v Kentucky, the Supreme Court reversed a burglary
conviction of a Black defendant by an all-White jury.45 On appeal,
the defendant argued, among other things, that the prosecutor
engaged in a pattern of discriminatory peremptory challenges by
removing all four Black jurors on the venire.46 The Court held
that in criminal cases, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits
prosecutors from intentionally discriminating against Black jurors
by employing peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors solely
on the basis of their race or on the unfounded assumption that
Black jurors as a class could not impartially weigh the state's
evidence against a Black defendant.47
Batson presented the Supreme Court with the opportunity to re-
evaluate its prior analysis of discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges announced in Swain v Alabama.48 In Swain, a Black
defendant, convicted of rape and sentenced to death, moved to
quash his conviction, arguing that he was denied his equal
protection rights because the prosecutor used several of his
41 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
44 Id. at 89; J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1420 (1994);
see Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991); supra
note 6 and accompanying text.
4s Batson, 476 U.S. at 83.
46 Id.
41 Id. at 89.
4' 380 U.S. 202 (1965); see Batson, 476 U.S. at 92-93 (explaining the
inadequacies of the Swain decision).
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peremptory challenges to remove Black members of the venire.49
The Court rejected Swain's claim, stating that in order to raise an
inference of invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, the defendant must discharge the burden of
proving systematic exclusion of Black potential jurors throughout
the criminal justice system through prosecutors' exercise of
peremptory challenges." The Batson holding rescinded this heavy
evidentiary burden placed on defendants, acknowledging the
practical difficulties of proving that the state systematically has
exercised peremptory challenges to exclude Blacks from the jury on
account of race, and allowed defendants to rely on the factual
circumstances of their own case."
In overruling Swains evidentiary burden, the Supreme Court
announced a new framework for lower courts to evaluate claims of
purposeful discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges. 2
As in any equal protection analysis, the burden is on the defendant
who alleges discriminatory selection to prove that the prosecutor
engaged in purposeful discrimination. 3 To make a prima facie
showing of wrongful discrimination in the prosecution's use of
peremptory challenges, the defendant must first establish that he or
she is a member of a cognizable racial group.54 The defendant
must then show that the prosecution used its peremptory challenges
to remove members of the defendant's race from the venire solely
on the basis of race, based on factual and circumstantial inferences,
which may include evidence of disproportionate impact on the
cognizable group.5  The Court proposed two "illustrative"
49 See Swain, 380 U.S. at 203-04.
50 Id. at 224.
5' Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 n.17.
52 Id. at 93-98.
13 Id. at 93.
14 Id. at 94. For example, the defendant must show that the prosecution is
removing Black jurors.
" Id. at 93 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)). For
example, if the attorney exercises several peremptory challenges to exclude
potential jurors who are unemployed, have low incomes or are uneducated, this
may have a disproportionate impact on Black jurors' removal as opposed to




examples to lower courts of evidence that could establish a prima
facie case of discrimination: a pattern of strikes against Black jurors
or the prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire.56
Once the trial court concludes that the defendant has estab-
lished such a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination, the
burden shifts to the state to provide a race-neutral explanation for
the challenges. 7 While the Court emphasized that the prosecutor's
explanation "need not rise to the level of justifying a challenge for
cause,""8 the explanation must go beyond mere general assertions
of the attorney's good faith and intuitive judgment in removing the
Black jurors.59 Rather, an acceptable neutral explanation must be
"clear and reasonably specific" '60 and must be "related to the [facts
of the] particular case to be tried.",6' Finally, it is within the
sphere of the trial judge's discretion to decide whether or not the
defendant has made out a case of purposeful discrimination.62
B. Extensions of Batson: The Continuing Erosion of
Peremptory Challenges
In his concurring opinion in Batson, Justice Byron White
foresaw that profuse litigation would be required to define the
boundaries of the Court's equal protection holding.63 The Court
has consistently been forced to extend the Batson holding in failed
56 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. The Court did not provide a bright line as to how
many strikes against Black potential jurors will establish a pattern of strikes
sufficient to raise an inference of discrimination, nor did it describe what
implications from the prosecutor's voir dire inquiry will raise such an inference.
Rather, the Court relied on its faith in the trial judges, experienced in supervising
voir dire, to determine if the case by case circumstances create a prima facie case
of discrimination. Id.
17 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
58 Id.
'9 Id. at 97-98.
60 Id. at 98 n.20 (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 258 (1981)).
61 Id. at 98.
62 See id. at 97-100.
63 Id. at 102 (White, J., concurring).
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attempts to strike a comfortable balance between the peremptory
challenge and the guarantees of equal protection.'
The free use of peremptory challenges was further limited to
comport with the guarantees of equal protection in 1991. In Powers
v Ohio,65 the Court held that a criminal defendant could make a
prima facie showing of intentional discrimination regardless of
whether the defendant and the excluded juror share the same
race.66 In Powers, a White defendant was convicted of murder
after the prosecutor peremptorily struck seven Black venirepersons
from the jury.67 The trial court rejected Powers' objections
because Batson required, as a threshold matter, that the defendant
61and the excluded juror share the same race. In reversing Powers'
conviction, the Court held that a criminal defendant has standing to
raise the equal protection claim of jurors who are wrongly excluded
through race-based peremptory challenges because the defendant is
injured by the risk that such discrimination taints the fairness of the
entire judicial proceeding.69 In addition, the defendant is an
effective advocate of the juror's right because they share the mutual
interest in eliminating discrimination from the proceedings and the
juror is unlikely to litigate the issue of discrimination because it is
such a burdensome process.70  Thus, the free exercise of
64 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1421 (1994)
(extending Batson to cases in which potential jurors are discriminated against
based on their gender); Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2357 (1992)
(applying Batson framework to discriminatory peremptory challenges exercised
by the defendant in a criminal case); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500
U.S. 614, 631 (1991) (extending the Batson framework to jury selection in civil
cases); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991) (holding that a criminal
defendant had third party standing to assert the equal protection right of an
excluded juror, whether or not the defendant and the juror are of the same race).
65 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
66 Id. at 402.
67 Id. at 402-03.
68 State v. Powers, No. 87AP-526, 1988 WL 134822, at *9 (Ohio App. Dec.
13, 1988), appeal dismissed, 536 N.E.2d 1172 (Ohio 1989), rev'd, 499 U.S. 400
(1991).
69 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. at 410-16.
70 Id. at 413-15. The Court also extended Batson to private litigants in civil
cases by holding that state action exists when private litigants exercise
peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner. See Edmonson v. Leesville
616
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peremptory challenges was further constrained because the Court
no longer required that the defendant and excluded juror be of the
same racial group for the defendant to force the prosecutor to
explain his or her strikes. Instead, the Court focused its attention on
the paramount importance of equal protection guarantees over the
tradition of peremptory challenges, and in that analysis, the
peremptory system necessarily takes second place.
The Supreme Court further extended the Batson equal protec-
tion holding and encroached upon the arbitrariness of peremptory
challenges in Georgia v McCollum7 by prohibiting criminal
defendants from discriminatorily exercising their peremptory
challenges.72 In McCollum, White defendants were accused of
assault and battery on a Black couple.73 The state moved to
prohibit the defendants from exercising their peremptory challenges
in a discriminatory way by removing Blacks from the jury.74 In
applying Batson equal protection analysis to criminal defendants,
the Court held criminal defendants to be state actors. Because the
Court enforces discriminatory peremptory challenges, regardless of
whether the prosecution or the defense engages in the discrimina-
tion, the excluded jurors and the community at large will attribute
the discrimination to the judicial process.75 Thus, the Court held
that the state had standing to raise the equal protection claim of the
excluded juror.76
Most recently, in J.E.B. v Alabama ex rel. TB., the Court
extended Batson to prohibit intentionally discriminatory, gender-
based peremptory challenges. 77 In J.E.B., a father in a paternity
action challenged the state's use of peremptory challenges to
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 624-28 (1991). Moreover, injury to excludedjurors
occurs in the courthouse, where society expects justice. Id. at 628.
71 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
72 Id. at 2353 ("Regardless of who invokes the discriminatory challenge,
there can be no doubt that the harm is the same-in all cases the juror is
subjected to . . . discrimination.").
71 Id. at 2351.
74 Id.
71 Id. at 2353-54.
76 Id. at 2357.
77 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1422 (1994).
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eliminate men from the jury.7" Six justices held that intentional
discrimination on the basis of gender by state actors violates the
Equal Protection Clause because "gender, like race, [is] an
unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality. 79
Because the case involved a gender-based classification, the Court
reached its conclusion by applying heightened equal protection
scrutiny, which requires that the gender-based peremptory chal-
lenges be substantially related to an important government
objective.8" In applying heightened scrutiny, the Court does not
balance the value of peremptory challenges as an institution against
its determination to eliminate invidious discrimination from court
proceedings.8 ' Rather, the Court assesses whether peremptory
strikes based on gender stereotypes substantially aid a litigant's
effort to procure a fair and impartial jurys2-the only legitimate
state interest and the sole purpose of peremptory challenges.83 The
Court reasons that gender- or race-based discrimination in jury
selection harms the litigants and the community, in addition to the
individual jurors who are excluded from the judicial process."
The litigant is harmed by the risk that the prejudice that prompted
the inappropriate exclusion of jurors will tarnish the entire judicial
process.8 5 The community is harmed because gender- and race-
based peremptory challenges, which rely on wrongful stereotypes,
reinforce societal prejudice and reduce the community's faith that
a fair trial is possible. 6
Thus, the Court's increasingly strict scrutiny demonstrates its
hostility to discriminatory peremptory challenges and suggests that
whenever peremptory challenges are subjected to equal protection
analysis, the prospective juror's constitutional right not to be
78 Id.
79 Id. at 1421.
o Id. at 1425-26. The only legitimate objective possible in the exercise of
peremptory challenges is to secure a fair and impartial jury. Id. at 1426 n.8.
S J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425-26.
82 Id.
3 Id. at 1426 n.8 (citing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614,
620 (1991)).





discriminated against will always supersede the interest in preserv-
ing the arbitrary nature of the peremptory challenge to obtain fair
and impartial juries.
III. THE APPLICATION OF BATsON IN NEW YORK: WHAT IS A
NEUTRAL EXPLANATION?
The U.S. Supreme Court purposely steered clear of delineating
specific procedures for lower courts to follow in implementing the
Batson evidentiary scheme, recognizing the variety ofjury selection
techniques employed in state and federal trial courts.17 Indeed, the
Court left the quandary of determining what evidence will
constitute a prima facie case and what explanations will be deemed
race-neutral, or conversely, pretextual, to the lower courts. In turn,
the New York courts have created their own evidentiary guidelines
for the prima facie case under both the federal and state constitu-
tions,"8 yet have had difficulty enunciating clear and predictable
'7 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 n.24; see id at 96-97; see also
Alschuler, supra note 29, at 233 n.15, (citing V. HALE STARR & MARK
MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION: AN ATrORNEY's GUIDE TO JURY LAW AND
METHODS 39-40 (Little Brown 1985)) ("[I]n thirteen states the judge alone
conducts the voir dire examination; in eighteen states attorneys are primarily
responsible for conducting this examination; in nineteen states the attorneys and
judge share the examination; and 75 [%] of federal judges permit no oral
participation of counsel in the voir dire examination.").
88 See, e.g., People v. Childress, 81 N.Y.2d 263, 266-67, 614 N.E.2d 709,
711, 598 N.Y.S.2d 146, 148 (1993) (establishing the minimum requirements to
make out a prima facie case). In New York, a pattern of strikes or questions and
statements made during the voir dire may be sufficient to raise the inference of
discrimination in a particular case. People v. Jenkins, 75 N.Y.2d 550, 556, 554
N.E.2d 47, 50, 555 N.Y.S.2d 10, 13 (1990). The movant may also demonstrate
that members of the cognizable group were excluded, while other venirepersons
with the same material characteristicswere not challenged. See People v. Bolling,
79 N.Y.2d 317, 324, 591 N.E.2d 1136, 1141, 582 N.Y.S.2d 950, 955 (1992).
Additionally, if the prosecution, for example, strikes potential jurors of a
cognizable group who, because of their experience and background would
otherwise be considered pro-prosecution, this circumstance may raise the
inference of a discriminatory motive. Id. Such inferences would also be raised
if the stricken jurors were a heterogeneous group including, for example,
different genders, careers and social backgrounds, yet all that they had in
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standards for analyzing the legitimacy of a race-neutral explana-
tion." An analysis of New York State's implementation of the
Batson doctrine demonstrates Justice Marshall's prescience in
stating that the goal of ending the racial discrimination that
peremptory challenges inject into the jury selection process will not
be met by Batson, but rather will require eliminating peremptory
challenges entirely.90 Justice Thurgood Marshall feared that when
the defendant established a prima facie case, thus shifting the
burden, it would be very difficult for the trial court to assess the
credibility of the prosecutor's motive to determine whether the
neutral explanation provided is actually in good faith, or con-
versely, a pretextual proxy for discrimination. 9' A glance at New
York courts' difficulty in distinguishing neutral from pretextual
explanations reveals that Batson's purpose of eliminating invidious
discrimination, not just minimizing it, is being undermined along
with the supposed arbitrary nature of the peremptory challenge.
A. The Subjective Nature of Pretext
The New York Court of Appeals' standard for determining
whether an attorney has provided a race-neutral explanation is quite
vague and merely mimics Batson. To rebut a prima facie case of
discrimination, the attorney's explanation must not be based on
race-related criteria, but it does not need to amount to a justifica-
tion for a challenge for cause.92 The explanation must also be
common was their cognizable grouping. See People v. Scott, 70 N.Y.2d 420,
425, 516 N.E.2d 1208, 1211, 522 N.Y.S.2d 94, 97 (1987). Courts are instructed
to take into account that the nature of peremptory challenges allows those who
are already inclined to discriminate to do so. See Boiling, 79 N.Y.2d at 324, 591
N.E.2d at 1141, 582 N.Y.S. at 955. Finally, the mere inclusion of token members
of the relevant cognizable group will not overcome an otherwise meritorious
prima facie case. Id.
" See, e.g., People v. Hemandez, 75 N.Y.2d 350, 552 N.E.2d 621, 553
N.Y.S.2d 85 (1990), aff'd, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (suggesting methods to assess
whether a race-neutral explanation is legitimate or pretextual).
90 Batson, 476 U.S. at 105-08 (Marshall, J., concurring).
9' Id. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
92 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97; see also People v. Hernandez, 75 N.Y.2d at
355, 552 N.E.2d at 623, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 87; People v. Peart, 197 A.D.2d 599,
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"clear and reasonably specific";93 merely denying discriminatory
motive or asserting good faith will not be sufficient.94 Finally,
even if the explanation proffered appears to be facially neutral, the
trial court must reject the explanation unless it is particularly
related to the factual circumstances of the case at bar.95 Because
these guidelines are so subjective and fact-based, the trial courts'
determinations are entitled to great deference on appeal. 96 Of
course, with this basis of review, reasonable minds can and will
differ. The result has been that subjective explanations, relying on
an attorney's perceptions, are beyond impeachment and the
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges remains unchecked.97
600, 602 N.Y.S.2d 424, 424 (2d Dep't 1993); People v. Duncan, 177 A.D.2d
187, 193, 582 N.Y.S.2d 847, 851 (4th Dep't), appeal denied, 79 N.Y.2d 1048,
596 N.E.2d 414, 584 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (1992). For example, after the inference of
discrimination is raised, an attorney cannot merely state that he or she
peremptorily challenged a Black juror because Black jurors, in the attorney's
experience, tend to sympathize with defendants.
93 Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.20; see People v. Hernandez, 75 N.Y.2d at 355,
552 N.E.2d at 623, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 87 (stating that the neutral explanation must
be "articulable").
94 Batson, 476 U.S. at 98; People v. Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d 317, 320, 591
N.E.2d 1136, 1139, 582 N.Y.S.2d 950, 953 (1992).
9' See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98; see also People v. Hernandez, 75 N.Y.2d at
357, 552 N.E.2d at 624, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (explaining that the "record-based
beliefs" offered to discharge the "Batson-based burden" of rebutting the inference
of discrimination must "not appear ... as a matter of law... [or,] to the lower
courts as a matter of fact[,] to be some facial facade").
96 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98 n.21; People v. Hernandez, 75 N.Y.2d at 356,
552 N.E.2d at 623-24, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 87-88.
97 See infra notes 114-27 and accompanying text; see also Joshua E. Swift,
Batson's Invidious Legacy: Discriminatory Juror Exclusion and the "Intuitive"
Peremptory Challenge, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 336, 362-63 (1993) (arguing that
soft-data exclusions, relying on attorneys' subjective impressions, should be
eliminated because trial courts cannot effectively analyze these reasons; thus,
Batson's protection against discrimination in jury selection remains illusory).
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B. Clever Lawyers Can Invent Neutral Explanations
The seminal case on the issue of pretext is Hernandez v New
York.98 Hernandez demonstrates lawyers' ability to manipulate
their purportedly race-neutral explanations so that the explanations
appear to be facially valid, while still perpetrating discriminatory
dismissal of potential jurors. In Hernandez, a Latino defendant was
convicted of attempted murder and on appeal argued that the
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude all Latino
veniremembers was purposefully discriminatory.99 Whether the
defendant had established a prima facie case was not an issue."00
The only issue was whether the prosecutor's explanation, that the
jurors' words and actions had given him reason to believe that the
jurors fluency in Spanish would complicate their ability to accept
the interpreter's translation of the testimony given by Spanish-
speaking witnesses and they would have undue impact on the jury,
was race-neutral and nondiscriminatory.'0' Although the jurors
stated that they would try to accept the interpreter's translation, the
prosecutor countered that while he believed "in [the jurors']
heart[s] that they will try to follow it..., [he] felt... uncertainty
as to whether they could accept the interpreter as the final
arbiter. 10 2 The defendant, in turn, argued that the prosecutor's
explanation was a pretext to keep Latinos off the jury because the
Latino culture and the Spanish language were so "inextricably
intertwined" that exclusion on the basis of language was inherently
exclusion on the basis of ethnicity. 10 3 Moreover, the record did
not indicate that the prosecutor asked any other non-Latino jurors
9' 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991), aff'g, 75 N.Y.2d at 355, 552 N.E.2d at 623,
553 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
9' People v. Hernandez, 75 N.Y.2d at 353, 552 N.E.2d at 622, 553 N.Y.S.2d
at 86.
'00 Id. at 353, 552 N.E.2d at 621, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
'0' Id. at 354, 356, 552 N.E.2d at 622, 623, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 86, 87.
"02 Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. at 356.




if they spoke Spanish."°4 Yet, the court of appeals found that the
prosecutor's concern that the Spanish-speaking jurors might be
unqualified or reluctant to accept the evidence presented, consti-
tuted a legitimate neutral ground for using a peremptory chal-
lenge. '5 The court also noted that it was for the trial court to
determine if the prosecutor's explanation was pretextual and
appellate courts will generally defer to the trial courts on the fact-
finding issue of pretext. °6
This explanation exemplifies the kind of clever lawyering that
circumvents Batson and jeopardizes the right of Latinos to
participate in jury service.'0 7 Because the prosecutor claimed that
he was classifying the potential jurors into two classes: those whose
specific demeanor suggested to him that they could accept the
official translation and those who persuaded him that they could not
accept the translation, he convinced the court of appeals that his
explanations were facially valid and that he had no discriminatory
intent.0" The Supreme Court, in affirming the New York Court
of Appeals,0 9 stated that if the prosecutor had merely explained
that he did not want to seat any Spanish-speaking jurors or any
Latinos, such explanations could be considered pretextual." But,
this distinction between neutral reasons and pretextual ones is inef-
fectual because they both have the same disproportionate impact on
Latino jurors."' By attributing the challenge to the jurors'
'o4 Id. 75 N.Y.2d at 363, 552 N.E.2d at 628, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 92 (Kaye, J.,
dissenting).
105 Id. at 356, 552 N.E.2d at 623, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
106 Id. at 356, 552 N.E.2d at 624, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (citing Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97-98 n.21 (1986)) (stating that fact-finding courts are
entitled to "great deference").
107 See generally Deborah A. Ramirez, Excluded Voices: The
Disenfranchisement of Ethnic Groups from Jury Service, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 761
(1993) (asserting that because language is intrinsically intertwined with race in
the Latino community, the arbitrary elimination of Latino members from juries
is a natural and direct consequence of their Spanish language fluency).
1"8 See Hernandez v. United States, 500 U.S. at 361, 372 (1991).
109 Id. at 358.
1"0 Id. at 371-72.
.. Id. at 361 ("While the prosecutor's criterion might well result in the
disproportionate removal of prospective Latino jurors, that disproportionate
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demeanor, a subjective perception, rather than to the jurors'
language or ethnicity, an objective classification, the prosecution
slyly subverted the inference of discrimination raised by the prima
facie case." 2 Hernandez, therefore, stands as authority to exclude
Latino venirepersons from juries where Spanish testimony will be
offered as evidence. Hernandez also serves as a symbol of the ease
with which a clever attorney's subjective impressions will be
considered facially valid."3
Cases where courts accept explanations based on the attorney's
subjective impressions validate Justice Marshall's fear that an
attorney's own conscious or unconscious racism may underlie his
or her subjective impressions of a particular juror."' Further,
Justice Marshall suggested that a judge's conscious or unconscious
racism may motivate him or her to accept such an explanation as
neutral."' For example, in People v Duncan, a defendant
appealed from a manslaughter conviction, alleging that the
prosecutor did not successfully rebut his prima facie showing of
intentional discrimination against a Black venirewoman.116 The
prosecutor explained that, in addition to the woman returning late
to the courtroom from a recess, it was his impression that, from the
character of her answers, she was "feisty, independent, opinionated
impact does not turn the prosecutor's actions into a per se violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.").
12 See Andrew G. Gordon, BeyondBatson v. Kentucky: A Proposed Ethical
Rule Prohibiting Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection, 62 FoRDHAM L. REV.
685, 696-99 (1993) (using the Hernandez decision to argue that an ethical rule
against discrimination in jury selection would prevent attorneys from proffering
pretextual explanations for discriminatory peremptory challenges). Gordon's
argument is flawed, however, because even if an ethical rule did curb some of
the abuses, it would still fall far short of Batson's true purpose of eliminating
discrimination from the jury selection process.
"' Two commentators have suggested that a prosecutor's purportedly race-
neutral explanations amount to "discrimination with a thousand disguises." Serr
& Maney, supra note 22, at 43.
114 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
"1 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
116 People v. Duncan, 177 A.D.2d 187, 189, 582 N.Y.S.2d 847, 848 (4th




and too much of a leader.""' Moreover, the prosecutor felt that,
given her attitude, this juror would try to control the deliberative
process." 8 The trial judge accepted this explanation as nonpretext
and the appellate division showed great deference to the trial
judge's fact finding on appeal." 9 While prototypically this is
exactly the kind of "seat-of-the-pants" instinct upon which attorneys
rely when exercising their peremptory challenges, acceptance of
such explanations, so easily grounded in prejudicial stereotypes,
elucidates the pervasive potential for discrimination in peremptory
challenges. Similarly, Justice Marshall warned that a prosecutor's
conscious or unconscious racism might lead him or her to the
subjective impression that a prospective Black juror is sullen or
distant, a characterization that would not have occurred to the
prosecutor if a White juror had acted in an identical manner. 121
.. Id. at 189, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
18 Id
119 Id. at 194, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 851; see, e.g., People v. Bessard, 148 A.D.2d
49, 543 N.Y.S.2d 760 (3d Dep't), appeal denied, 79 N.Y.2d 845, 546 N.E.2d
193, 546 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (1989). A similar result was reached in Bessard, where
the explanation that two Black women did not fit an attorney's preconceived
ideal juror profile was held to be a neutral explanation for peremptory challenges
against them. Id, at 52, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 762. In Bessard, the defendant appealed
from a murder conviction arguing, among other things, that the prosecutor did
not provide a race-neutral explanation for striking two Black venirewomen. Id.
at 52, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 761. To rebut the prima facie case, the prosecutor
explained that he had an ideal juror profile for this case, consisting of older
persons, coming from the same area where the murder took place, preferably
males rather than females, because men were more likely to understand firearms
and would therefore better comprehend complicated forensic evidence. Id at 52,
543 N.Y.S.2d at 762. The prosecutor also asserted that he saw the two Black
women laughing and he did not believe that this conduct suited a murder trial.
Id. Notwithstanding the fact that this explanation was based on a host of
stereotypes, the trial judge accepted the prosecutor's explanation that the two
Black women did not fit his profile and the appellate court affirmed. Id at 53,
543 N.Y.S.2d at 762. Although this case was decided before Batson was
extended to gender-based discrimination, it is a clear indication of how a clever
attorney can carefully outline a profile which appears facially valid, yet still
contains discriminatory intent.
120 Bessard, 148 A.D.2d at 53, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 762; see also Broderick,
supra note 6, at 412 (listing several kinds of stereotypes upon which attorneys
rely as the basis of their peremptory challenges); Alschuler, supra note 29, at 210
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These kinds of subjective explanations are distressing not only
because they may often be motivated by stereotypes, but also
because they are difficult to challenge.' 2' A judge must be acutely
aware of the rapport between the potential juror and the lawyer if
the judge is to verify these impressions. Even with such heightened
awareness, it is very unlikely that a judge will be able to remember
all of the body language and behavior of the veniremembers;12
thus, these unverifiable explanations are easily exploitable by
talented counsel. It is for this reason that Judge Kaye dissented
from People v Hernandez, arguing that the court of appeals should,
under New York law,2 1 clearly articulate guidelines for determin-
ing when a proffered explanation is neutral, thus rebutting the
inference of discrimination or pretext.'24 Judge Kaye would hold
that an explanation that may appear facially valid, yet has a
disparate impact on a cognizable group, is inherently suspect and
should be subject to heightened scrutiny. 125 Therefore, "a reason
that is grounded largely in speculation rather than facts uncovered
in a voir dire examination, as revealed by the record, should not be
accepted... [because] to conclude otherwise can too easily permit
discriminatory practices to continue.' ' 126 Although Judge Kaye
believes that closer inspection of proffered neutral explanations will
(citing a confidential manual used to instruct Dallas, Texas prosecutors in the
technique of jury selection, which lists even more stereotypes upon which
attorneys rely in exercising their peremptory challenges).
12 See Swift, supra note 97, at 362 ("Subjective reasons, [such as a juror's
body language, demeanor, facial expression or attitude,] are simply unimpeach-
able" because they are so difficult to verify.).
22 See Serr & Maney, supra note 22, at 59 n.317 ("It is very unlikely that
a trial judge can remember all the idiosyncracies exhibited by the prospective
jurors during voir dire, especially when the prosecutor gives his explanation, if
at all, subsequent to the questioning of all venirepersons.").
123 See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11; N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 13.
124 People v. Hemandez, 75 N.Y.2d 350, 360, 552 N.E.2d 621, 626, 553
N.Y.S.2d 85, 90 (1990) (Kaye, J., dissenting).
125 Id. at 362, 552 N.E.2d at 627, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 91; see Serr & Maney,
supra note 22, at 54-55 (suggesting that unemployment, low income or a lack of
education are facially neutral reasons which may have a disparate impact on
minorities and can easily serve as a pretext for purposeful discrimination).




more effectively achieve Batson purpose of eliminating invidious
discrimination from the jury selection process, it is clear that even
when judges do find pretext, such a finding neither affects this
purpose, nor deters future attempts to discriminatorily exercise
peremptory challenges. The only way to comply with the Supreme
Court's mandate of equal protection and eradicate this invidious
discrimination is to abolish peremptory challenges altogether.127
C. Problems When Lawyers Cannot Invent Neutral
Explanations
Even when the Batson framework is functioning properly and
pretextual explanations for discriminatory challenges are detected,
the efficacy of both the peremptory challenge system and the entire
criminal justice system is being undermined. The peremptory
challenge system is being damaged because judges are undermining
attorneys' free use of peremptory challenges by finding pretextual
explanations for challenges which are supposed to require no
explanation at all. 2 The criminal justice system is being dam-
aged because when the attorney's explanations for striking a
particular juror are deemed pretextual, the attorney is accused of
lying on the one hand and discriminating on the other.129 Not
only does a discriminatory strike followed by a pretextual explana-
tion offend and violate the equal protection rights of the excluded
juror, but it erodes the trust that a judge puts in an attorney to be
honest, fair and just in the courtroom. 3 ° Public confidence in the
fairness and neutrality of the criminal justice system, in turn, wanes
because the attorneys who practice within it cannot be trusted.''
Batson sought to eradicate discriminatory peremptory challenges for
these very reasons, yet ironically, eight years later, the problems
remain even where the framework functions properly. For this
27 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 108 (Marshall, J., concurring).
.28 See supra note 42 (discussing how the application of equal protection
analysis destroys the nature of the peremptory challenge system).
129 Telephone Interview with Justice Phyllis Skloot-Bamburger, Supreme
Court of the State of New York, Bronx County, N.Y. (Oct. 28, 1994).
130 id
'3 See Broderick, supra note 6, at 418.
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reason, the New York Legislature should eliminate peremptory
challenges entirely.
One situation commonly found to be pretextual, although
seemingly facially valid, is when an attorney uses the juror's
employment, or lack thereof,132 as an excuse for a peremptory
challenge. 133 In People v Bennett, for example, the prosecutor
challenged two Black women based on her subjective feeling that
their occupations suggested that they would be too sympathetic to
the defendant. 134 The first woman worked for the Department of
Income Maintenance, which the prosecutor described as a "liberal"
profession and thus felt that the juror would be sympathetic to the
"underprivileged" defendant. 135 The second woman was chal-
lenged for the same reason because she was a social worker who
worked with pregnant women and mentally retarded people.
1 36
Significantly, the prosecutor did not believe that the defendant was
underprivileged, nor did she question the potential jurors on their
attitudes toward the "underprivileged.' ' 37 Interestingly, the
prosecutor did not challenge another non-Black juror who worked
with deaf and mentally retarded people, but simply stated, "that's
different."'' 31 Such frivolous transparent explanations now seem
sinister, whereas under the classical peremptory paradigm, they
would not have been required. 39 The attorney, unable to proffer
132 See, e.g., People v. Williams, 199 A.D.2d 445, 446, 605 N.Y.S.2d 383,
384 (2d Dep't 1993), appeal denied, 83 N.Y.2d 916, 637 N.E.2d 289, 614
N.Y.S.2d 398 (holding pretextual the explanation that ajuror "[had] a dim view
of any person charged with a crime" because he was unemployed).
133 See generally Serr & Maney, supra note 22, at 45 (discussing when a
juror's employment or lack thereof may serve as a legitimate race-neutral
explanation for a peremptory challenge and when it serves as mere pretext).
134 614 N.Y.S.2d 430, 432 (2d Dep't 1994). The defendant was convicted
of murder and criminal possession of a weapon and appealed, arguing that the





131 See also People v. Payton, 209 A.D.2d 661, 661-62, 613 N.Y.S.2d 25,
26 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 84 N.Y.2d 830, 641 N.E.2d 172, 617 N.Y.S.2d
151 (1994) (holding pretextual the explanation that a White juror was challenged
because the juror was an arts administrator who organized arts and education
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a race-neutral explanation, may seem like a liar, intentionally
fabricating reasons to mask a discriminatory intent. Thus, attention
is drawn to the discrimination, but it is not eliminated.
Another facially valid explanation, which has been rejected as
pretext, occurs when the attorney claims that the juror cannot be
fair because he or she has a relative who has been prosecuted for
a crime. In People v Manuel,140 the prosecutor removed two
potential Black jurors because they had relatives who were
prosecuted for crimes, but did not remove a potential White juror
who had a relative who was jailed for assault and robbery.14'
Because this facially valid criterion was not equally applied to
Black and non-Black jurors, the appellate division found the
explanation to be a pretext for discrimination. 42 The foregoing
kinds of pretext for racial discrimination are particularly disturbing
in urban areas where "the burden of unemployment, low income or
poor education is likely to fall disproportionately on minorities";
thus, these characteristics may be proxies for race and must be
painstakingly scrutinized. 43 It is evident that even where pretext-
ual explanations are being detected, the peremptory nature of the
peremptory challenge and the integrity of the criminal justice
system are both being subverted.
programs for students); People v. Dabbs, 192 A.D.2d 932, 934, 596 N.Y.S.2d
893, 895 (3d Dep't 1993) (holding pretextual the explanation that a female
juror's employment in an affirmative action unit of a state agency was an
indication of a sympathetic attitude toward Blacks and other minorities); People
v. Duncan, 177 A.D.2d 187, 190, 582 N.Y.S.2d 847, 849 (4th Dep't 1992),
appeal denied, 79 N.Y.2d 1048, 596 N.E.2d 414, 584 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (holding
pretextual the explanation that Black juror's employment as a technician at a
local hospital indicated that the juror did not "really ... give a damn," and,
therefore, could not adequately serve on the jury).
140 182 A.D.2d 711, 582 N.Y.S.2d 735 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 80 N.Y.2d
834, 600 N.E.2d 646, 587 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1992).
141 Id at 711, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 737.
142 Id. But cf People v. Richardson, 193 A.D.2d 969, 598 N.Y.S.2d 341 (3d
Dep't 1993) (holding race-neutral the explanation that a Black potential juror
could not serve on the jury because he had a cousin serving a jail sentence,
although two White potential jurors who had relatives with criminal convictions
were not peremptorily challenged).
141 Serr & Maney, supra note 22, at 54; see also McMillian & Petrini, supra
note 13, at 370.
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IV A CURRENT LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL: CHIEF JUDGE KAYE'S
JURY PROJECT
Committed to overhauling the New York jury system, Chief
Judge Judith Kaye assembled a task force called the Jury Project,
which recommended, among other things, a revision of New York's
peremptory challenge statute in the Criminal Procedure Law."
The Jury Project report suggests that the number of peremptory
challenges allowable should be reduced from twenty to fifteen for
Class A felonies, from fifteen to ten for Class B and C felonies,
from ten to seven for Class D and E felonies and from two to one
per alternate.'45 Additionally, the report proposes that judges
should have the authority to increase the number of peremptory
challenges in appropriate cases. 46 The report explains that reduc-
ing the number of peremptory challenges will cut down on Batson
violations, while preserving the power of the peremptory challenge
as a tool to create fair and impartial juries. 47 However, this
assertion is not entirely accurate.
While it is true that the Jury Project's recommendations would
reduce the number of Batson violations, they compromise the goal
behind Batson, thus defeating one of the Jury Project's own
purposes. 48 The recommendations will reduce violations because
it will be more difficult to meet the initial burden of the prima
144 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.25.
's THE JURY PROJECT: REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK 65 (1994).
146 Id. at 69 ("Such an increase may be appropriate in cases involving
extensive pretrial publicity, a very large number of defendants, or other
extraordinary circumstances.").
141 See id. at 66. The report also recommends reducing voir dire time and
cutting down on the number of prospective jurors needed to obtain a jury in a
criminal case. Id. at 66, 68.
148 The primary purpose of the Jury Project was not to resolve Batson issues
in New York courts. Rather, the task force intended to overhaul the jury system,
thereby reducing opportunities for Batson violations, saving prospective jurors'
time and the state's money by requiring fewer citizens to report for service, and
limiting the number of citizens who have the unsatisfying experience of
performing jury duty without actually serving on a jury. See id at 68.
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facie case. Because the prima facie case is most often established
by evidence of a pattern of strikes that appear discriminatory, once
the number of peremptory challenges is reduced, it will be more
difficult to establish such a pattern and thereby raise the inference
of discrimination. 49 But, the inability to establish a prima facie
case does not reduce the likelihood that peremptory challenges will
be used in a discriminatory manner against any one particular juror.
Individual potential jurors will still be denied their equal protection
rights because the movant on their behalf will face prohibitive
obstacles in establishing an inference of discrimination; therefore,
this proposal is insufficient to secure the equal protection and civil
rights of each potential juror.150 Moreover, even when a prima
facie case is established, the pretext problem remains a thorn in
Batson's side. Thus, Batson's goal of eliminating invidious
discrimination from jury selection is not addressed; it is merely
swept under the carpet.
V THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE: BANNING PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES
In their critical concurrence in People v Boiling, New York
Court of Appeals Judges Joseph Bellacosa, Sol Wachtler and Vito
Titone implored the legislature to end "the proliferation and
permutation of problems in the appellate pipeline" and "honor[ ]
and achieve[ ]" the purposes of Batson by eliminating the peremp-
tory challenge process."' They argued that peremptory challenges
have outlived their usefulness and, notwithstanding the Batson
limitations, cloak invidious discrimination, rather than make it
disappear. 152
Both the interest in preserving the peremptory challenge
tradition and the interest in abolishing discriminatory jury selection
' See supra note 88 (discussing the standards for the prima facie case in
New York).
ISo See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11; N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 13.
' People v. Boiling, 79 N.Y.2d 317, 326, 591 N.E.2d 1136, 1142, 582
N.Y.S.2d 950, 956 (Bellacosa, J., concurring).
152 See id. (Bellacosa, J., concurring).
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are disserved by the "middle ground" remedy of Batson5 3 and
the futile proposal to reduce the number of peremptory challenges
allowable in New York. Peremptory challenges, by their very
nature, are an arbitrary and subjective means of classifying
individuals, which allow attorneys to exclude veniremembers based
on no more than unprovable hunches and instincts. 154 This kind
of classification is necessarily irreconcilable with the Equal
Protection Clause, which demands sufficient justification for such
divisions among citizens to assure that the classification is neither
irrelevant nor illegitimate.'55 Thus, once conventional equal
protection analysis is applied to peremptory challenges, as evi-
denced by Batson and its progeny, the peremptory challenge system
necessarily decomposes.'56 Because peremptory challenges have
not been declared unconstitutional, their application has created a
legal fiction, the quasi-peremptory challenge, requiring a race-
neutral explanation for challenges that should require no explana-
tion whatsoever. 1 7 This legal fiction is inadequate to fully purge
the jury selection process of its pervasive discrimination. The U.S.
Supreme Court's desire to preserve the peremptory institution has
"' Serr & Maney, supra note 22, at 62. Batson is a "middle ground" remedy
because, rather than eliminating peremptory challenges entirely, it requires
explanations that compromise the peremptory nature of the challenges. The
problem is that "analytically, there is no middle ground: [a] challenge either has
to be explained or it does not." McMillian & Petrini, supra note 13, at 374.
' See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (citing Lewis v. United
States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892)).
15 See supra note 6 (providing a brief explanation of equal protection
analysis).
16 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 124 (1986) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing that there is no logical end to the application of equal
protection scrutiny to'peremptory challenges because "every peremptory
challenge could be objected to on the basis that, because it excluded a venireman
who had some characteristic not shared by the remaining members of the venire,
it constituted a 'classification' subject to equal protection scrutiny").
117 Alschuler, supra note 29, at 200 (arguing that the "quasi-peremptory"
challenge denies courts the "indulgence" of presuming that prosecutors act for
legitimate reasons even where they probably do not).
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allowed the judiciary to censure some blatant forms of discrimina-
tion while allowing other, more concealed forms to flourish. 58
Lawyers are encouraged to discriminate more creatively,
arriving at clever race-neutral explanations for their challenges,
which are no more than crude and unbecoming ways of classifying
human beings that Batson permits and validates. 5 9 Whether the
explanation is accepted, and stereotypes flourish, or rejected as
pretextual and the attorney is perceived as a liar or a discriminator,
jurors' equal protection and civil rights are abridged and the
integrity of the criminal justice system and the public confidence
therein is eroded. Therefore, the legislature should confront the
reality of Batson's "euphemisms and ... rationalizations"'60 and
declare peremptory challenges what they really are and should
be--challenges for cause. Abrogation of the peremptory challenge
system would protract the incalculable damage being done to the
credibility of the criminal justice system and the constitutional
rights of potential jurors not to be arbitrarily discriminated against.
Opponents to such an abrogation argue that peremptory
challenges encourage confidence in the fairness and neutrality of
the criminal justice system because such challenges are a critical
means of selecting impartial jurors.'6 ' However, this argument is
unpersuasive because it ignores the decrease in public confidence
... Alschuler, supra note 29, at 201 (citing Chisolm v. State, 529 So. 2d 635,
639 (Miss. 1988)) (That peremptory challenges cannot be exercised for a racially
discriminatory reason in no way precludes their exercise for a "non-race based
reason that objective and fair-minded persons might [otherwise] regard as
absurd.").
5 See Alschuler, supra note 29, at 201.
160 People v. Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d 317, 326, 591 N.E.2d 1136, 1142, 582
N.Y.S.2d 950, 956 (Bellacosa, J., concurring).
6' See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 119 (1986) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (quoting W. FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 175 (1852)).
Justice Scalia, an avid supporter of the peremptory challenge system, argues that
the system should be upheld because, as a whole, it has been even-handed and
that is why it has coexisted with the Equal Protection Clause for 120 years.
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1437 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). However, this argument is disingenuous; school segregation also had
a long history of coexisting with the Equal Protection Clause until the Court saw
fit to eradicate that particular kind of invidious discrimination. Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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in the system where potential jurors are being discriminated against
based on stereotypes. Groups that are continually excluded from
this civic duty are likely to presume that the government classifies
them in offensive ways and is unresponsive to their rights and
concerns. 162 Moreover, this argument ignores the decline in the
public's faith in the fairness of judicial proceedings because when
attorneys' explanations are deemed pretext, the attorney is accused
of lying and the assumption is that dishonesty infects the entire
process.
Other opponents of abolishing the peremptory challenge system
insist that the handicap of not being able to strike jurors with
deviating backgrounds and opinions will enhance their extreme
positions on the jury and extend jury deliberations or encourage
more hung juries. 163 However, in order for the jury to function
properly, it must reflect the defendant's peers in society. 64
Moreover, the challenge for cause is still an available remedy to
eliminate radical jurors. Thus, eliminating peremptory challenges
would ensure jury service and equal protection to potential jurors
with traditionally underrepresented viewpoints more than it would
exacerbate extreme opinions.1
65
Perhaps the strongest argument against eliminating peremptory
challenges to protect prospective jurors' equal protection rights is
that it improperly exalts the rights of the excluded juror over the
rights of a criminal defendant who may face imprisonment or even
162 Broderick, supra note 6, at 419. (Arguments that peremptory challenges
promote confidence in our legal system by allowing litigants to actively select
their juries ignore "the peremptory's countervailing ability to diminish the
public's overall estimation of the judiciary's fairness.").
163 Gurney, supra note 19, at 255 (citing John C. Harrison, Peremptory
Challenges and the Meaning of Jury Representation, 89 YALE L.J. 1177, 1190
n.55 (1980)). The argument that peremptory challenges should be maintained to
prevent the administrative burdens of extendedjury deliberations and hung juries
fails because administrative burdens have never been held an adequate justifica-
tion for violating individuals' rights to equal protection. See Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973).
" Gurney, supra note 19, at 255-56 (arguing that eliminating peremptory
challenges would not significantly alter jury diversity and would assure jury
service to those who have been underrepresented in the past).
165 Gurney, supra note 19, at 256.
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death. 66 Although prospective jurors are protected, defendants are
less able to guard themselves from being judged by a biased jury
because there will be no mechanism to remove jurors with latent
biases unless a juror openly admits prejudice during voir dire. 67
Even though this argument is compelling, it is important to
remember that defendants are still afforded the opportunity to
challenge biased jurors for cause. 168 It is true that attorneys could
no longer rely on their subjective and perhaps stereotypical
impressions to strike jurors without explanation, but the challenge
for cause provides a suitable mechanism to achieve fair and
impartial juries if attorneys carefully and strategically develop their
voir dire questions to elicit informative responses from potentially
biased jurors. 169 Moreover, equal protection is a constitutional
right, whereas the right to a peremptory challenge may be withheld
without encroaching on any constitutional guarantee. 170 Thus,
although the criminal defendant's stake in preserving the peremp-
tory challenge appears more significant where he or she faces harsh
penalties for crimes charged, the defendant remains adequately
protected by the challenge for cause rubric, and cannot constitution-
ally discriminate against other citizens to achieve what he or she
considers to be a fair and impartial jury.17'
166 Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2360 (1992) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
167 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
168 Under New York's Criminal Procedure Law, a challenge for cause is an
objection to a prospective juror which may be made, inter alia, on the grounds
that he or she has "a state of mind that is likely to preclude him [or her] from
rendering an impartial verdict based on the evidence adduced at trial." N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 272.20.
169 See Gurney, supra note 19, at 245-46, 257-62.
70 McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2358; see supra part I.
... See McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2358 ("It is an affront to justice to argue
that a fair trial includes the right to discriminate against a group of citizens based
upon their race.").
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CONCLUSION
In Batson v Kentucky 172 and its progeny, the U.S. Supreme
Court endeavored to prevent racial discrimination in the exercise of
peremptory challenges. The Court attempted to accommodate the
competing interests of the equal protection rights of citizens not to
be improperly discriminated against when they report to court for
jury service and the traditional belief that the free use of peremp-
tory challenges insures fair and impartial juries. New York lower
courts' application of the Batson framework, however, confirms
that the Batson remedy fails to balance these interests successfully.
Discriminating attorneys are still able to rely on stereotypical
assumptions to strike jurors from the venire so long as the attorneys
invent a clever explanation to mask their discriminatory intent.
Thus, excluded jurors' equal protection rights are still being
violated. In addition, where attorneys are less astute and their
explanations are deemed pretextual, the discrimination is not
prevented, but merely recognized. In either case, the arbitrary
nature of the peremptory challenge is jeopardized. As a solution,
this Note recommends that the New York legislature eliminate the
peremptory challenge statute from the Criminal Procedure Law. In
reality, eliminating the peremptory challenge is the only way to
achieve Batson true purpose of removing discrimination from the
jury selection process.
172 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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